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Theatre History: The Quest for Instabilities1 
Michal Kobialka 
Every thinking of history is always 
adequate to the moment at which it 
appears and always inadequate to 
the moment that follows. 
B. Croce, History: Its Theory and 
Practice 
Recent publications concerning the field of theatre history and panels at 
various national and international scholarly conferences indicate that many 
practicing theatre historians have become aware of the changes that have 
occurred in the perception of theatre history and in the nature of the cognitive 
tools that enable them to enter any historiographie investigation.2 That is to 
say, these theatre historians recognized an ineluctable fact that the field itself 
is not anymore identical with nineteenth century positivistic/scientific or 
"objective" manipulating of descriptive detail within the received historical 
frameworks which have been bestowed upon them by both the tradition and 
various schools of thought in which they were trained. By so doing, moreover, 
they have moved away from a dialogical/rhetorical understanding of discourse 
as a methodology/hypothesis of exclusion in the direction of voicing a different 
type of discourse thus far dismissed in historiographie investigations. The 
purpose of this essay is to focus on the current form of an emerging discourse 
by the way of addressing the practice of historiography of the past/present that 
Michal Kobialka has had essays published in Theatre History Studies and Journal of Dramatic 
Theory and Criticism. 
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placed the historian in the privileged position of presiding over the past, 
developing it, and controlling it. I will also try to show that the emerging 
discourse facilitated a shift from a methodology toward a strategy, i.e., a 
practice with the help of which a historian is able to demonstrate his/her 
ability to detect the paradigms affecting the object, its position in a discursive 
formation, as well as the changes affecting several discursive formations within 
a given space of representation. My conclusion will offer a suggestion that this 
"new historiography" expresses a mode of existence of a form of discourse 
rather than a practice transforming or imposing meaning, form, context, or 
theme in the linear/chronological, for this matter causal, investigations in the 
field of theatre history. 
In his Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism, Haydn White 
maintains that historiography emerged as a recognizable scholarly discipline in 
the West in the nineteenth century as a direct consequence of a hostility to all 
forms of myth: 
Both the political Right and the political Left blamed mythic 
thinking for the excesses and failures of the Revolution. False 
readings of history, misconceptions of the nature of the historical 
process, unrealistic expectations about the ways that historical 
societies could be transformed-all these had led to the outbreak of 
the Revolution in the first place, the strange course that 
Revolutionary developments followed, and the effects of the 
Revolutionary activities over the long run. It became imperative to 
rise above any impulse to interpret the historical record in the light 
of party prejudices, Utopian expectations, or sentimental attachments 
to traditional institutions. In order to find one's way among the 
conflicting claims of the parties which took shape during and after 
the Revolution, it was necessary to locate some standpoint of social 
perception that was truly 'objective,' truly 'realistic.'3 
This particular explanation of the emergence of a historiographie process 
introduces us to and marks a rupture in the nineteenth-century understanding 
of the nature of historiography. That is, one can discern in it (1) a line of 
demarcation between historiography defined as a literary art form and as a 
science grounded in a "verum ipsum factum" principle, and (2) a shift in the 
direction of the scientific perception of history rooted in some form of an 
external order of things. This differentiation between various perceptions of 
history may function, thus, to use Michel Foucault's terminology, as an 
epistomological threshold which suspends the continuous accumulation of 
knowledge, interrupts its slow development, and forces it to enter a new 
dimension.4 
Multiple questions surfaced as a result of this rupture: how should the 
past be seen; what is the purpose of the historian; what is the nature of the 
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questions that should be asked by historians; what are the demands and 
consequences of historical consciousness? All these questions delineated the 
border lines and the horizons of the space of representation in which the 
discourse about historiography emerged in the nineteenth century. This space 
of representation contained in itself the principles of two major methodologies 
of historiography, interpretation and explanation, both of which reflect multiple 
and complex transformations in the concept of the coglto. 
The statement that the historian had to interpret his/her materials in 
order to construct the pattern of images in which the form of the historical 
process was mirrored is reflected in the interpretative models of historiography 
created by Hegel.5 In his Philosophy of Mind, Hegel postulates that the 
process of cognizance takes place in the infinite mind wherein the object is, 
first, perceived (sensuous consciousness); second, referred to the universal 
(sense-perception); and, third, reduced or raised to the appearance of a self-
existent inner being (intellect).6 All these processes, in which the individual 
object relates itself to consciousness, are a determination of reflection. For 
this process to be valid there exists a need for self-consciousness which, in 
Hegelian phenomenology, is the truth of consciousness. Its function is to 
question the one-sided activity of the Ego, (Ich), that is, self-consciousness is 
a reflection-into-self, the other confronting the self in the process of shaping 
the external object. In his "reflective historiography," Hegel established thus 
the cognitive/interpretative authority of the historian by the fact that it was the 
historian who perceived and selected an object of inquiry, referred it to the 
abstract universal, and, finally, gave it shape guided by a critical self-
consciousness. The object, in this case the representation of the past/history, 
was thus written from a point of view of consciousness which was corrected by 
self-consciousness. 
Such a perception of historiography was, however, sharply criticized by 
the positivists because, in their view, the "interpretation" could not be fully 
classified as a legitimate form of knowledge since interpretation was only an 
opinion which, in scientific terms, was subjective in nature. They rejected the 
interpretation as a tangible approach in historiography and in its stead 
introduced the concept of the "explanation" entrenched in cause-and-effect 
patterns, continuities, linear succession, chronology, and an attempt to define 
totality.7 Historiography was "verum ipsum factum" deeply rooted in the 
external order of things defined by a social matrix or ideological narratives.8 
"Up until now," asserted Marx, "philosophers have only interpreted the world. 
in various ways; the point, however, is to change it."9 Yet another significant 
aspect of the Marxist school of historiography was not only a shift in the 
cognitive process but also a shift in the definition of what history was. As 
Poster observes: 
History, for Marxists, is written neither for amusement nor for self-
cultivation. One writes history in order to promote revolution. 
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Class struggles of the past, however diverse their characters, are 
gathered by these historians and confirm the movement of social 
liberation in the present. Hence the continuity of the past and the 
present is maintained. The Marxist historian is no mere curator of 
a museum of forgotten struggles but, by virtue of his or her 
knowledge, a privileged participant in the present situation of 
revolt.10 
The idealist or the positivist attitude notwithstanding, 
history/historiography then, and, I would suggest, also today, is dominated by 
the confines of one methodology. For example, in her article, "Psychoanalysis 
and the Polis," Julia Kristeva provides an in-depth analysis of both directions 
indicating the shortcomings of either of the two methodologies or their 
variations.11 More importantly, however, her article posits yet another rupture 
and signifies a movement away from historiographie monism in the direction 
of relativism. Kristeva suggests to her reader that a political reading is 
inherent in both an idealist interpretation as well as in a positivist explanation. 
That is, interpretation, wherein the position of a historian is not questioned, 
presents the subject-object relation in a form of a dynamic transformation 
controlled by the subject and the language used to describe this relationship; 
explanation transforms the subject-object relation in terms of expressing the 
subject's necessity to turn this dynamic into an action. As a corollary, both 
interpretation and explanation express the desire to give meaning to what is 
being analyzed, perceived, or evaluated: 
[E]ven if interpretation does no more than establish a simple logical 
connection, it is nevertheless played out on the scene of speaking 
subjectivity and the moment of speech. Two great intellectual 
ventures of our time, those of Marx and Freud, have broken through 
the hermeneutic tautology to make of it a revolution in one instance 
and, in the other, a cure. We must recognize that all contemporary 
political thought which does not deal with technocratic 
administration—although technocratic purity is perhaps only a dream 
-uses interpretation in Marx's and Freud's sense: as transformation 
and cure. Whatever object one selects, its interpretation reaches its 
full power, so as to tip the object toward the unknown of the 
interpretative theory or, more simply, toward the theory's intentions, 
only when the interpreter confronts the interprétable object.12 
Furthermore, Kristeva warns the supporters of either mode of operation that 
political interpretations have produced nothing more than two powerful and 
totalitarian results: Fascism and Stalinism, both of which destroyed rather 
than contributed to an intellectual forum. According to Kristeva, in order for 
historiography, understood as explanation/interpretation, to function, 
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psychoanalysis must be imposed so as to control the process: "Psychoanalysis, 
critical and dissolvant, cuts through political illusions, fantasies, and beliefs to 
the extent that they consist in providing only one meaning, an uncriticizable 
ultimate Meaning, to human behaviour. The psychoanalytic intervention is an 
antidote to political discourse."13 Thus Kristeva calls for the abandoning of 
monism and the acceptance of relativism as a guiding intellectual force in the 
quest for the answers to the questions of how the past should be seen, what 
the purpose of the historian is, and what historiography is, questions already 
asked in the nineteenth century, asked again here with a different method-
ology to provide the answers and a different taxonomy to describe the 
phenomena. 
Hegel, Marx, and Kristeva see historians and history as mediators 
between past and present. Historiography has, therefore, been perceived by 
them as a temporal science investigating objects in terms of their permanence 
and the dimensions of both the changes they undergo and our awareness of 
the passing of time in which these changes take place. What differentiates the 
works of these three people are the methods of their inquiry, shaped by either 
cognitive intellectual processes (Hegel), social matrix/dialectics (Marx), or 
psychoanalysis (Kristeva). Consequently, historical inquiry has been viewed as 
a process in which an object's features are imposed upon it by a methodology, 
any methodology-prelogical, antilogical, or dialectical—in order to establish its 
image, trace its absence, or set up a network of coherency and orderliness 
between the elements of the evaluated material. Moreover, defined in terms 
of a methodology, historiography automatically bestows the authority, be it 
ideological or totalitarian, upon the speaker/writer. This very act of placing, 
for example, a historian in a privileged position implies that s/he "knows" a 
certain truth about the past (i.e., defines where the act is taking place) and 
represents it in his/her writing (language used to describe the act). The whole 
process becomes an act of creation justified by the cognitive methodology used 
and producing a discourse with a set of meanings reflecting the idealists', 
positivists', liberals' assumptions concerning the nature of historiography. 
Historical writing and history itself are then nothing more than a practice of 
bringing to the fore only this history which produces a kind of continuous 
history by excluding (i.e., setting up the binary opposites) or erasing (i.e., 
ideological erasure) this discourse which imposes the closure or difference 
between the past and the present. However, as Michel Foucault observed in 
his Archaeology of Knowledge: 
If the history of thought could remain the locus of uninterrupted 
continuities, if it could endlessly forge connexions that no analysis 
could undo without abstraction, if it could weave, around everything 
that men say and do, obscure synthesis that anticipate for him, 
prepare him, and lead him endlessly towards his future, it would 
provide a privileged shelter for the sovereignty of consciousness. 
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Continuous history is the indispensable correlative of the founding 
function of the subject: the guarantee that everything that has 
eluded him may be restored to him; that certainty that time will 
disperse nothing without restoring it in a reconstituted unity; the 
promise that one day the subject-in the form of historical 
consciousness—will once again be able to appropriate, to bring back 
under his sway, all those things that are kept at a distance by 
difference, and find in them what might be called his abode.14 
The consequences of such a perception of historiography can be seen in 
various articles and books published on, for example, medieval theatre and 
drama, and specifically on the nature of the Quern quaeritis and the Régulons 
Concordia}5 
As long as historiography is defined in terms of uninterrupted continuities 
supported by hypotheses and methodologies, we will always find ourselves 
participating in the dispute that originated in the nineteenth century and whose 
purpose was to convince the audience about the myth called "progress." By 
consciously or subconsciously accepting this myth, theatre historians have been 
led to discuss history in terms of such notions as patterns, successions, 
traditions, influences, similarities, differences, repetitions, resemblances, 
developments, evolutions, links, connections, trends, themes, concomitance, 
structures, etc., in order to isolate and establish a group of phenomena which 
would allow them to view history as a single hypothesis established via a 
retrospective methodology which reduces the differences between objects, 
separates the new, or discusses origins. By so doing, they rewrote, transcribed, 
translated, approximated, transferred, and systematized the objects of the past 
into the objects of the present, imposing upon them the categories set up by 
the above-mentioned procedures of intervention as legitimatized in their own 
time.16 
As indicated by Einstein and Heisenberg in physics in the first decades 
of the twentieth century, temporal series of succession and analogy had proved 
to be inadequate since it is impossible to state that time is absolute, that it is 
universally the same, or that it flows steadily from the past toward the future. 
Moreover, 
it is impossible to determine with arbitrary high accuracy both the 
position and momentum (essentially velocity) of a subatomic particle 
like the electron. The effect of this principle is to convert the law 
of physics into statements about relative probabilities instead of 
absolute certainties.17 
This displacement of Euclidean geometry and Newton's concept of time as a 
fixed science and the emergence of Relativity (time), Uncertainty (objects), 
and Infinity (space) as the tools of inquiry mark a threshold not only in physics 
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but in historical consciousness itself. If the bankruptcy of the temporal series 
as a guiding principle is accepted as it was in physics and the twentieth-century 
avant-garde drama and theatre,18 historiography faces the task of changing its 
notions about what is being represented, how it is being represented, and why 
it is being represented. That is, historiography must confront the task of 
changing the traditional dynamics between the subject and the object, or 
between the act and the language used to describe the act. What follows is not 
yet another perspective about historiographie relativism as suggested by 
Kristeva; it is an attempt to indicate that historiography is or should be an 
expression of a shift and transformation in contemporary experience, rather 
than an attempt to operate as a science dominated by a hypothesis promoted 
via a retrospective methodology rooted in the Newtonian time sequence. 
Contemporary experience can be explained in terms of quantum theory 
and microphysics. One of the major shifts that has taken place is the 
alteration of the idea of performance in a stable system in which its evolution 
could be predicted if all the variables were known. That is, the traditional 
belief stipulated that if all the particles constitute a determined system in the 
universe at a moment "t," it is possible to predict its state at a moment t1 > t. 
However, as quantum mechanics indicates, a complete definition of an initial 
system is impossible since it would require an expenditure of energy at least 
equivalent to that of the system in question. In other words, any historian 
trying to write a history of a theatrical/literary period would have to set up the 
boundaries of investigations and include in his/her inquiry all the information 
at the micro and macroscopic scales. Such an endeavour, as any theatre 
history textbook shows is futile since any attempt of this nature must lead to 
the selection of the material based on the availability of data, the relationship 
between the subject and the object, as well as the cognitive methodology used 
in the process of defining the stable system. Indubitably, as quantum theory 
points out, this procedure has its significant limitations that pose valid 
questions concerning both the predictability of knowledge and the authority of 
the historian. More significantly, however, quantum theory posits that external 
phenomena are governed by the principles of uncertainty, unpredictability, and 
probability rather than by solely the energy brought into the system: 
The relation between the scientist's statement and "what 'nature9 
says" seems to be organized as a game without perfect information. 
The modalization of the scientist's statement reflects the fact that the 
effective, singular statement (the token) that nature will produce is 
unpredictable. All that can be calculated is the probability that the 
statement will say one thing rather than another. On the level of 
microphysics, "better" information-in other words, information with 
a higher performance capability-cannot be obtained. The problem 
is not to learn what the opponent ("nature") is, but to identify the 
game it plays.19 
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The principles of uncertainty, unpredictability, and probability, inherent in the 
"post-modern experience," disqualify then stable systems, links, and patterns by 
indicating that discontinuities occur in determined phenomena, causing them 
to take unexpected forms. Thus, one is faced with unstable systems which are 
characterized by undecidables, the lack of precise control, incomplete 
information, discontinuities, and pragmatic paradoxes. Such a system produces 
not the known but the unknown and the tension between the two that appears 
at the virtual point. It suggests a model of legitimation that has nothing to do 
with performance as defined by the analyst, but has as its basis "difference" 
understood as a search not for consensus but for instabilities; a search not for 
the knowledge about the system but for the multiple formations appearing and 
disappearing within it. 
In this definition of historiography, the historian abandons the quest for 
a resemblance between things or historical periods and concentrates on 
similitude. Generally speaking, resemblance can be defined as a device in a 
cognitive process with the help of which an object of inquiry is recognized, 
described, and categorized by the historian. It implies a process which is 
shaped by the external order of things or by various procedures of intervention 
(i.e., ideology introduced into the historical area) which are accepted in their 
own time. It is because of resemblance that the historian makes an 
observation that an object is always the same-it is this thing which is 
contrasted with that other thing. For example, St. Gall's Quern quaeritis is 
usually contrasted with and compared to the Quern quaeritis of the Regularis 
Concordia in order to support the treatment of the latter as a liturgical play, 
drama, or liturgical music-drama since it contains the basic elements of 
drama—mimesis, action, dialogue, etc. Similitude is a device in a cognitive 
process with whose help elements covered by the object or obstructed from 
view are revealed. This process of discovery/disclosure cannot be solely 
analyzed in terms of the procedures of intervention because the historian does 
not know exactly what elements will appear from behind the silhouette of the 
object. The analysis will be an analysis of the tension between values, rather 
than ideologies brought into the space of representation by the historian, and 
the shadow emerging from behind the object. An example of such a process 
may be an analysis of the monastic, vernacular, and secular context in which 
the Quern quaeritis appears in the Regularis Concordia before any conclusions 
about the nature of this trope are drawn.20 
One becomes aware that resemblance, functioning in stable systems, 
reveals only the clearly visible—objects that are what the exterior makes them 
or that assume qualities of other objects which are known to us. Similitude is 
freed by the affirmation of an unstable model from both stable systems and a 
temporal perception of objects. Similitude affirms nothing; instead, it 
represents what objects hide, prevent from being seen, render invisible, or 
erase from visible representation. 
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The shift of focus from resemblance toward similitude compels a 
historiographie process to enter a different dimension of cognizance which will 
be moulded by questions such as: which elements can be isolated from others; 
what system of relations (hierarchy, stratification, determination) can be 
established between the elements that appear in a given space of 
representation; how is this space of representation transformed into a 
discourse; what are the processes that alter the objects that appear and 
disappear in a given space of representation; and what are the grounds upon 
which we might try to establish different historical sequences. All these 
questions refer us back to the concept of the search for instabilities and a 
concept of knowledge grounded in quantum theory. At the same time, it 
becomes apparent that the rejection of temporal series and a unity of discourse 
based on the permanence of objects frees us from a historiography understood 
in terms of hypothesis and methodology, whether reflective of idealism, 
positivism, or liberal/ideological inquiry, all of which can only exist in stable 
systems which are controlled by Newtonian time series and Euclidean 
geometry. 
The discourse which was initiated and which surfaced with quantum 
theory and recent theories of cognizance is located in the space where various 
objects emerge, re-emerge, and are continuously transformed. This space, 
often referred to as a space of representation, is defined in terms of rupture, 
discontinuity, and instability. The objects in this space of representation do not 
exist in a void, but in a network of relations on microscopic or macroscopic 
scales. In addition, the objects, as well as their inherent characteristics, can be 
displaced or transformed as they move or when they encounter a threshold in 
the space of representation in which they have emerged. As Foucault 
observes: 
And the great problem presented by such historical analyses is not 
how continuities are established, how a single pattern is formed and 
preserved, how for so many different, successive minds there is r* 
single horizon, what mode of action and what substructure is implied 
by the interplay of transmissions, resumptions, disappearances, and 
repetitions, how the origin may extend its sway well beyond itself to 
that conclusion that is never given-the problem is no longer one of 
tradition, but one of division, of limits; it is no longer one of lasting 
foundations, but one of transformations that serve as new 
foundations, the rebuilding of foundations.21 
This view of historiography is bereft of all the elements of temporal series 
that underlie any methodology. Succession and analogy become obsolete 
because they indicate linear, chronological progressions that lead to a single 
horizon. But there is no single horizon, on meaning, or one ideology in the 
post Einsteinian and post Heisenbergian world. Accordingly, historiography 
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should not be perceived as a temporal (time oriented) but as a spatial 
dimension. Time is not entirely rejected in this construct, but is transformed 
into a function rather than a factor determining the permanence of objects. 
As has been indicated, the Newtonian concept of time as an absolute and 
universal element moving steadily from the past toward the future is the 
foundation of the traditional concept of history. As such, it has been used in 
various historiographie investigations as the primary tool in delineating the 
boundaries of various discourses locating them in linear, parallel, or causal 
frameworks. Most of the standard theatre history books make use of this 
principle of ordering by presenting twelve, nineteen, or thirty-six periods in the 
description and analysis of the body of the material. In his recent study, "The 
Criteria for Periodization in Theatre History," Postlewait not only questions the 
modes of division, taxonomies used, and, ultimately, the relationship between 
methodological manipulating of descriptive detail and the detail itself, but also 
warns us about the problem of reductive explanations characteristic for the 
systems based on Newtonian physics: 
The concept of periodization, in its normative if somewhat 
misleading usage, delineates one aspect of history, the condition of 
stability (or identity), in relation to another aspect, the process of 
change (or difference). These two aspects of human events, though 
dynamically interrelated and mutually defining, are separated in 
historical study for descriptive and analytical purposes. The 
continuous flow of time is organized into heuristic categories, 
episodes of our creation. As such, periods are interpretative ideas 
of order that regulate meaning.22 
In the suggested construct based on quantum theory, space, rather than time, 
is brought to the fore as the locum of historical research since time perceived 
in terms of being a determining factor establishing the permanence of objects 
is a normative category. Defined as function, time ceases to be the primary 
investigative tool in the process of imposing the boundaries upon the space of 
historical research. 
The space in which the historical discourse takes place has no stable 
qualities, since, as quantum theory indicates, one cannot predict what nature 
will produce; all that can be calculated is probability. Probability and 
uncertainty are the key phrases in the description of the space in which 
historical events occur. The historian in such a construct is stripped of the 
power and the ideology provided by a methodology. Instead, s/he is forced to 
enter the field without the notions that made "interpretation" or "explanation" 
legitimate research methods because s/he cannot control the process which is 
taking place. Nor is the historian fully aware of shifts and transformations 
taking place, since information is incomplete and systems are unstable. The 
historian is, then, primarily assuming the function of an observer of the 
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ruptures and transformations occurring in the space in which the object of 
inquiry has emerged or re-emerged. 
Our perception of historiography must alter completely with such a 
model. For, rather than a system in which a historian has been empowered to 
impose rules and categories upon phenomena, we are faced with a system in 
which the historian has seen the futility of his/her actions since s/he has little 
to do with what is happening in the space of representation, since the 
discourse is not based on the permanence of objects. Equipped with the 
understanding of functions operating in a space, the historian has an 
opportunity to enter a different, unknown dimension, in order to collect 
information about the visible and invisible sides of the object, and to observe 
it. The historian ought to realize that rules, strategies, functions, and 
categories can be found in the object itself and in the network of relations 
between the object and other elements that keep emerging and disappearing. 
The nature of the relationship between the historian and the object/space of 
representation is best described in True West when Sam Shepard says that 
M
.. . the one who's chasm' doesn't know where the other one is taking him. 
And the one who's being chased doesn't know where he's going."23 Thus, the 
historiographie discourse is a tension between the processes in the space of 
representation (similitude) and the information both located in and brought 
into the space by the historian (functions). 
Taking power away from the historian is an unprecedented step in 
historiography. It removes the historian from the position of supremacy 
inherent in arranging information and places him/her in the position of an 
observer/participant of the changes occurring in a given space of 
representation. More importantly, however, taking power away from the 
historian indicates the death of methodology as a cognitive tool. Instead, it 
implies that historiography can only be discussed in terms of strategies that are 
plotted on the basis of the changes and tensions between and within the 
objects in a given space of representation and within the historian. What are 
these strategies? How are they formed? How is the space of representation 
defined? What processes take place during emergence and disappearance of 
objects in a given space of representation? What are the relations between the 
objects which are formed? What are the relationships between the objects 
constituting a discursive formation? What processes take place between other 
discursive formations within a given space of representation? What are the 
principles of recurrent redistributions, ruptures, gaps, discontinuities existing 
within this and other spaces of representation? What are the levels of the 
discourse in this three dimensional space? These are the questions that might 
be asked by the historian who sees history as a mode of existence of a 
discourse rather than as a practice of establishing and stabilizing the 
boundaries of a discourse by the condition of identity or difference. 
These processes have several consequences. First, quantum theory and 
microphysics force us to abandon nineteenth-century concepts of cognizance 
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and to move in the direction of cognizance based on similitude rather than 
resemblance. As a corollary of this shift, historiography is perceived as a 
reflection of a spatial, rather than temporal, dimension of human awareness. 
Second, the acceptance of the spatial dimension of historiography opens up a 
different level of perception which discloses what has been hidden thus far. 
The historian will discover the object that stayed in the shadow of permanence 
based on succession and analogy. The new elements of finitude and infinity 
will pose new questions about objects and their relation to other elements in 
the three-dimensional space of representation. The function of the historian 
will be, then, to observe the emergence of the object, its movement through 
the network of relations, thresholds, discontinuities, etc., in order to define the 
elements seminal to each series, to disclose and describe the relations between 
the series, and to trace their disappearances and redistributions. Third, new 
questions will surface once the concept of strategy is substituted for the 
concept of methodology. Historiography perceived in terms of strategy 
suggests a model that is open, since it is based solely on uncertainty and 
instability. With the help of strategies defining the basic functions of the space 
of representation, a historian can observe the rules and categories to be found 
through the object itself. Fourth, with the disappearance of methodology and 
the concept of total history, and with the acceptance of strategy, we can see the 
emergence of historiography which is not moulded by cognitive processes, 
social matrixes, or psychoanalysis. What emerges is historiography which is an 
autonomous form governed by its own rules and paradigms: 
[Historiography] would be that which puts forward the unpresentable 
in presentation itself; that which denies itself the solace of good 
forms, the consensus of a task which would make it possible to share 
collectively the nostalgia for the unattainable; that which searches for 
new presentations, not in order to enjoy them but in order to impart 
a stronger sense of the unpresentable. [A historian] is in the 
position of a philosopher: the text he writes, the work he produces 
are not in principle governed by preestablished rules, and they 
cannot be judged according to the text or to the work. These rules 
and categories are what the work of art [and the historian] are 
looking for.24 
University of Minnesota 
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